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Chapter 8 1
Travel as a Basis for Atheism: Free-Thinking 2
as Deterritorialization in the Early Radical 3
Enlightenment 4
Charles T. Wolfe 5
I have been driven out of the court, where I knew not what to do; 6
if they push me to leave France, wherever in Europe I shall go, I 7
have acquaintances there thanks to my name. I can easily 8
accommodate myself to a variety of foods and garments; I am 9
indifferent towards climates and men. 10
—Théophile de Viau, 1623 (De Viau 1668, 13/1965, 58; all 11
translations are mine unless otherwise indicated.) 12
It is up to us to go to extreme places, to extreme times, where the 13
highest and deepest truths live and rise up. The sites of thought 14
are the tropical zones frequented by the tropical man, not the 15
temperate zones of the moral, methodical or moderate man. 16
—Gilles Deleuze (1962, 126.) 17
Abstract The early modern radical savant did not travel so much as he read 18
travel narratives. From Montaigne’s cannibals to Locke’s talking parrot, from 19
Leibniz’s plans to create a race of “warrior slaves” to Diderot’s utopian Voyage 20
de Bougainville, a kind of ‘science fiction’ or ‘deterritorialization’ of the narrative 21
of the familiar, Eurocentric, Plato-to-Hegel narrative of Western philosophy can be 22
discerned. A key feature of these artificial travel narratives is that they serve as 23
a basis for proclaiming atheism (and China plays a well-known role here). The 24
radical savant described here is neither the solitary meditator, nor the participant 25
in communal knowledge-gathering projects for national glory (Bacon, Linnaeus). 26
He (for it is always a he in this case) is less a producer of a stable, cumulative body 27
of knowledge than a destabilizer of forms of existing knowledge. 28
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142 C.T. Wolfe
8.1 Introduction: Early Modern Knowledge-Gathering 29
and Heterodoxy 30
We have grown accustomed to certain familiar pictures or scenes of the early 31
modern savant – images d’Épinal, they would be called in French: reassuring 32
coloured pictures in schoolbooks. These include, minimally, the savant as player 33
in a communal enterprise (Bacon and Boyle, in the Royal Society; Fontenelle and 34
Maupertuis, in the Paris and Berlin Academies of Sciences) and the savant as 35
‘solitary’ (Descartes’s rejection of authority and what some have called his emphasis 36
on the individual over the community1). In other words, some savants have a House 37
of Salomon, and some do not. More recently, attention has turned to a third figure we 38
might call the savant as wanderer or traveler: hence the multiplication of Atlantic, 39
Pacific, Caribbean narratives of knowledge expansion.2 By ‘traveler’ I do not mean 40
someone in a rather territorially homogeneous process of movement, like Locke’s 41
flight to Holland during the years 1683–1688, but rather, an individual involved in 42
either of two kinds of knowledge-gathering projects: 43
(a) enterprises of trans-national expansion of knowledge and science like Linnaeus’ 44
wanting new plants for Sweden and sending his students around the world, 45
including Daniel Solander on James Cook’s first trip around the world, in 1768– 46
1771; Linnaeus was quite explicit about Nature having “arranged itself in such 47
a way that each country produces something especially useful”3; 48
(b) enterprises of internal dépaysement or Entfremdung – that is, ‘de-familiarizing’ 49
enterprises, like Leibniz’s projects to investigate talking dogs, stones containing 50
plants or dried fish, or most surprising, fossilized remains of unicorns, the latter 51
in his geological work intended as the first volume of a history of the House 52
of Hanover, the Protogaea4; enterprises which perturb the sense of familiarity 53
1Cf. Garber 1998, 40. This is not just true of the best-known texts such as the Discourse and the
Meditations, but also the Regulae (Rule 3 emphasizes the importance of individual knowledge
over and against knowledge from authority). Of course, one can also view Descartes as deeply
‘dialogical’ given the effort he put into collecting responses e.g. to the Meditations, but I do not
think this attitude is ‘fundamental’ to his natural-philosophical project.
2Delbourgo and Dew, eds., 2008; Schaffer, Roberts et al. eds. 2009 (and commentary in Golinski
2011), and the various publications by Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, including Cañizares-Esguerra
and Seeman, eds., 2007.
3Linnaeus, letter of 10 January 1746 to the Swedish Academy of Science, quoted in Koerner 1996a,
151; see also Koerner 1996b. This aspect of Linnaeus has been well-known since Lisbet Koerner’s
study (Koerner 1999); a good shorter analysis is Sörlin 2000, 60–65. Interestingly, Linnaeus’ vision
of an oeconomia naturae (which may have influenced Smith’s idea of the invisible hand), a vision
of balance and equilibrium, meant that he refused to accept racist ideas about inequality of different
races: “Wild peoples, barbarians and Hottentots differ from us only because of sciences; just like
a thorny sour-Apple differs from a tasty Reinette, only through cultivation” (1759 speech to the
Swedish Royal Family, quoted in Rausing 2003, 193).
4Leibniz wrote that he “has now seen and heard the talking dog; it pronounced well the words thé,
caffé, chocolat, and assemblée, among others” (Leibniz 1849–1855, IV, 199, cit. in Ariew 2005,
139). On the Protogaea overall see Claudine Cohen’s recent critical edition (Leibniz 2008).
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or self-identity of a Western ‘self’ or ‘narrative’. I do not discuss Leibniz’s 54
fascination with China here (see for instance his 1697 opuscule Novissima 55
Sinica and his 1716 Discours sur la théologie naturelle des Chinois; Leibniz 56
1994; Perkins 2004). But I do return to Leibniz below – not as a promoter of 57
universal peace and rationality, nor as a natural philosopher addicted to exotica 58
and natural curiosities, but as a more Eurocentric, sometimes even Teutonic 59
thinker who often spoke for Christian political power when he declared that 60
“The Turks have already learnt our military arts and naval science : : : ” (Leibniz 61
1923, IV: 1, 398, emphasis mine). The latter Leibniz is less the philosopher 62
“who considered heaven to be his country” and more the man who wrote a 63
poem beginning “Exulta, Germania!” when Belgrade was finally taken back 64
from the Turks (Almond 2006, 467). 65
In the fascination with the unfamiliar to which Leibniz, among others, bears 66
witness, sometimes despite himself, there is an intimation of a more destabilizing 67
project, which I shall call in what follows knowledge as deterritorialization: 68
a process by which a territorially familiar, essential, ‘native’ state or ethos is 69
weakened, subverted and generally uprooted so that it becomes unfamiliar, non- 70
foundational and de-essentialized.5 We can see the latter kind of intention – it is 71
hard to call it a ‘project’, since such cognitive enterprises are rarely ‘knowledge- 72
gathering’ enterprises in any standard, cumulative sense and are even less likely to 73
have a systematic character – taken up within the twilight world of the libertins 74
(free-thinkers) and particularly the clandestine manuscript tradition from the mid- 75
seventeenth to the mid-eighteenth century, with texts such as the Treatise of 76
the Three Impostors, a variable combination of libertine texts, depending on the 77
manuscript version, such as Vanini and Charron, extracts of Hobbes and especially 78
Spinoza (it contains the first French translation of the Appendix to Book I of 79
Spinoza’s Ethics), which circulated in ever-reworked forms during the first half 80
of the eighteenth century, beginning in 1719.6 What may emerge from this is the 81
emergence of a fourth figure (in addition to the group player, the solitary thinker, 82
and the traveler): the savant as a radical, moving as it were from the intellectual 83
galaxy studied by Robert Merton and Steven Shapin to that studied by Margaret 84
Jacob and Jonathan Israel.7 85
5The term ‘deterritorialization’ was first used in Deleuze-Guattari’s 1973 Anti-Oedipus, where it
had a psychoanalytic connotation of the freeing of a libidinal entity from pre-established objects of
investment; but it quickly, in their Thousand Plateaus of 1980 (translation, Deleuze-Guattari 1987),
also comes to mean a socio-political process whereby, e.g., a population is either dispossessed of
its territory (like peasants by lords) or in contrast, freed from a fixed territory such as land or a
factory. Closer still to the sense in which I am using the term, Deleuze and Guattari say in their
work on Kafka that “the first characteristic of a minor literature in any case is that in it language is
affected with a high coefficient of deterritorialization” (Deleuze and Guattari 1986, 16).
6The classic study of the clandestine tradition is Wade 1938; for recent overviews of the
topic see Benítez 1996a, b; Thomson 2005, 2008, especially chapter 5: “Journalism, Exile, and
Clandestinity.”
7Margaret Jacob’s focus on Freemason networks (in addition to her better-known studies on
Newtonianism, the English Revolution and the Scientific Revolution) in Jacob 1981, 2006 fits as it
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Moving from the savant as participant in a communal enterprise such as the 86
Royal Society to the solitary meditator dissecting calves’ or sheep’s brains on 87
Amsterdam’s Kalverstraat and thirdly, to the traveler-wanderer, we arrive, then, at 88
a fourth figure: a gentleman or rogue, scholar, pamphleteer, diplomat or amateur, 89
who does not travel (except to flee punishment and censorship), is not engaged in 90
globalized commerce – except in very diffuse senses such as the vitalist reception 91
of Chinese medicine of the pulse via Jesuit translations, which I mention below – 92
nor in the production of typical ‘exotica’ except inasmuch as they are reinterpreted 93
to suit radical purposes: call them ‘radical exotica’. A typical producer of radical 94
exotica would be the esprit fort (and army captain) Boyer d’Argens, with works 95
such as the Lettres juives (Boyer d’Argens 1738–1742), in which a group of Jewish 96
travellers exchange impressions and stories of their adventures in various countries 97
of Europe and the Mediterranean, or his Lettres chinoises of the following year, 98
in which Spinoza’s God is presented as derivative of the Chinese Li. Indeed many 99
Europeans, d’Argens says, “follow a System which strongly resembles that of these 100
new Chinese Commentators. Spinosa, a Dutch savant, was its inventor, or rather he 101
restored it; for it is claimed that his sentiments were already, more or less, those 102
of several ancient Philosophers.”8 We see here a more or less direct statement of a 103
sentiment often derived from Pierre Bayle (who would not have approved of it in this 104
form): millions of atheists forming a stable, ethically grounded society cannot all be 105
wrong! I shall call this conceptual figure promoting such views the radical savant. 106
Before seeking to further articulate this figure, particularly its relation to 107
processes of deterritorialization, I should mention some methodological difficulties 108
that arise in this sort of reflection. Notably, it is not clear how one might maintain 109
such types in systematic isolation from each other. Consider the vitalist reception 110
and appropriation of Chinese and Japanese medicine in eighteenth-century France, 111
mentioned above. What should we make of this case? It is indeed a heterodox case 112
within Western medicine: vitalists construct medical knowledge of the pulse through 113
Jesuit narratives of Chinese and Japanese medicine,9 articulating a heterodox 114
were somewhere in between a narrative of respectable natural philosophers functioning as pillars
of society and a narrative of anti-social, ‘mad dog’ deists / atheists / materialists like John Toland or
the anonymous authors of the Theophrastus redivivus (1659), the Treatise of the Three Impostors
(sometimes dated to 1716; cf. Benítez 1996a, 203), or The Material Soul (L’Âme Matérielle,
approx. 1725–1730; Niderst 2003).
8Boyer d’Argens 1739–1740, vol. I, letter XIV, 106 (this text apparently served as a basis for Oliver
Goldsmith’s Chinese Letters). It is not possible here to go into details about this entertaining and
interesting work; the first Chinese traveller-narrator describes how, upon arriving in Le Havre, he
is asked if in China they believe in the Pope, and when he answers No, how he has to convince the
crowd that his compatriots are also neither Huguenots nor Jansenists : : :
9Proust 1998; Terada 2006. There are Chinese and Japanese sources for the vitalist view: the
former were notably collected in R. P. Harvieu/Louis-Augustin Allemand’s 1671 Les Secrets de
la Médecine des Chinois and the 1702–1776 Jesuit compendium Lettres édifiantes et curieuses
écrites des missions étrangères par quelques Missionnaires de la Compagnie de Jésus; the latter
notably include Willem Ten Rhijne’s 1683 Dissertation de arthritide: mantisa schematica de
acupunctura : : : (London/The Hague/Leipzig 1683; translation in Carrubba and Bowers 1974).
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Western ‘holism’ through the appropriation of ‘Eastern’ medical ideas. The more 115
‘holistic’ trend in Enlightenment medicine appropriates these traditions in a much 116
more sympathetic way than mainstream medicine which tended to speak of them as 117
nonsense, or of Asian medicine as backwards, e.g., as lacking any knowledge of the 118
circulation of the blood. There is a striking contrast between mainstream Western 119
medical discourse saying Chinese medicine is nonsense, and (for instance) the 120
vitalist Ménuret de Chambaud saying in no less a publication than the Encyclopédie 121
that the Chinese have “gone further than us” (“il n’est pas étonnant qu’ils [les 122
Chinois] soient allés plus loin que nous & qu’ils n’aient des lumieres supérieures 123
aux nôtres”; Ménuret, “Pouls,” Enc. XIII, 227a). He adds that they have a superior 124
understanding of the interrelations of organs (“les filiations & les correspondances 125
des visceres entr’eux sont sans doute bien apperçues en général,” 227b). Ménuret 126
studied the Maijing by Wang Shuhe as translated in Du Halde’s 1735 Description 127
de l’Empire de la Chine (Description géographique, historique, chronologique, 128
politique et physique de l’Empire de Chine et de la Tartarie Chinoise).10 129
It is debatable whether Ménuret’s positive judgment is an instance of extension 130
of a national body of knowledge, or a kind of recognition of alterity in knowledge 131
(a cosmopolitanism in knowledge, as it were); but it is not quite the figure of 132
the radical construction of knowledge I am interested in, for it lacks a certain 133
destabilizing dimension. To be sure, even if the vitalist interest in Chinese and 134
Japanese medicine is not part of an aggressive program to destabilize European 135
religious, metaphysical or political values, it nevertheless testifies to a different type 136
of ethos, a non-conquering one. We are clearly no longer dealing with the kind of 137
rhetoric which is probably most famous in its Baconian variant, of extending the 138
“power and empire of the human race itself over the universe of things,” or “the 139
knowledge of causes, and secret motions of things; and the enlarging of the bounds 140
of human empire, to the effecting of all things possible,” as Bacon describes the 141
ultimate goal of the program of the New Atlantis.11 142
It is noteworthy that the Jesuits were forbidden from studying and practicing medicine, and did not
give much reports of treatments such as acupuncture. They focused on sphygmology (medicine
of the pulse). Conversely, Ten Rhijne focuses on practices such as acupuncture (a word he is
often credited with inventing), and does not mention the medicine of the pulse. On the role of
sphygmology in the conceptual articulation of vitalist medicine in the eighteenth century see
Terada 2006, and Wolfe and Terada 2008.
10To be clear, I am not using the word ‘holism’ in any especially valuative sense – in the older but
still common sense, found on both sides of the ‘divide’, that Eastern thought is holistic whereas
Western thought is mechanistic, with the implication that Western thought has somehow come
closer to a hidden (holistic) truth by learning from the East – but rather as a historico-theoretical
construct which had a certain efficacy. Namely, if ‘mechanism’ is the respectable paradigm of
Western medical science in the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries (and beyond), ‘holism’ is a
kind of heterodoxy, and as far back as the early eighteenth century, anti-mechanists looked to the
East for legitimizing sources of their knowledge – which could be assimilated to ‘native’ forms of
exotica such as the Hippocratic paradigm.
11Francis Bacon, Novum Organum I, 129; New Atlantis, in Bacon 1996, 480.
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8.2 Knowledge as Conquest 143
Sometimes the idea of conquest just takes the form of an analogy between a project 144
in natural philosophy and the voyages of discovery: 145
it is fit that I publish and set forth those conjectures of mine which make hope in this 146
matter reasonable, just as Columbus did, before that wonderful voyage of his across the 147
Atlantic, when he gave the reasons for his conviction that new lands and continents might 148
be discovered besides those which were known before; which reasons, though rejected at 149
first, were afterwards made good by experience, and were the causes and beginnings of 150
great events. (Bacon, Nov. Org. I, xcii). 151
This is still very vivid as an idea two centuries later when Charles Fourier (the 152
Utopian socialist) asserts that an inventor stands to new ideas as a traveler-naturalist 153
stands to new plants that he brings back from an expedition: 154
To ask that an inventor not move away from received ideas is like demanding that a 155
naturalist, upon returning from a voyage of exploration, present not a single new plant. 156
Those who brought us back from America quinoa, tobacco, potatoes, cocoa, vanilla, indigo 157
and cochineal – haven’t they done us a much greater service than if they had only brought 158
back known species? (Fourier 1845, ix–x). 159
Early modern savants are not always content with such analogies; in their zeal at 160
achieving a kind of ‘global reach’ (a popular term in international relations theory, 161
some decades prior to the term ‘globalization’, used to describe roughly the same 162
economic phenomenon: Barnet and Muller 1974) they can depart from analogy 163
altogether and plan real mastery of the world. Leibniz has been described as “the 164
only prominent modern philosopher to take a serious interest in Europe’s contact 165
with other cultures” (Perkins 2004, 42). But the actual forms this “serious interest” 166
could take are quite surprising. For after all, even the very respectable Leibniz, who 167
“considered heaven to be his country,” proposed a plan for training a new army 168
of warrior slaves, in an audacious 1671 text entitled “A Method for Instituting a 169
New, Invincible Militia that can Subjugate the Entire Earth, Easily Seize Control 170
over Egypt, or Establish American Colonies” (written as an addendum to his better 171
known Consilium Aegyptiacum or Egyptian Plan): 172
A certain island of Africa, such as Madagascar, shall be selected, and all the inhabitants 173
shall be ordered to leave. Visitors from elsewhere shall be turned away, or in any event it 174
will be decreed that they only be permitted to stay in the harbor for the purpose of obtaining 175
water. To this island slaves captured from all over the barbarian world will be brought, 176
and from all of the wild coastal regions of Africa, Arabia, New Guinea, etc. To this end 177
Ethiopians, Nigritians, Angolans, Caribbeans, Canadians, and Hurons fit the bill, without 178
discrimination. What a lovely bunch of semi-beasts! But so that this mass of men may be 179
shaped in any way desired, it is useful only to take boys up to around the age of twelve.12 180
As Ian Almond nicely observed about the Consilium Aegyptiacum, “Leibniz’s 181
advice to Louis XIV, his attempt to persuade the monarch that an attack on Egypt 182
12Leibniz 1923, IV, 1: 408; quoted and discussed in Smith 2011, 243.
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would be ‘to the profit of Christendom’, appear almost to have been written with 183
Gramsci and Said’s analysis of the intellectual’s complicity with imperialistic 184
hegemony in mind” (Almond 2006, 464). The origin of this unpleasant fantasy 185
of global reach (but policy and fantasy are not separated by any Chinese walls!) 186
seems to have been Thomas Sprat’s “Relation of the Pico Teneriffe,” presented to 187
the Royal Society in 1667 (Dascal 1993, 391), and the concept is very much that 188
of the Janissaries in the Ottoman Empire. Leibniz’s well-known fascination with 189
China goes in the opposite direction : : : (Leibniz 1994; Perkins 2004; Mungello 190
1998) but the above text bears witness to a more obsessively ‘Orientalist’ mindset. 191
In contrast, a later text entitled “An Utopian Island” expresses what we might call 192
more ‘multicultural’ sentiments (Dascal 1993). 193
Less disturbingly, the kind of confident, linear expansion of ‘our’ knowledge 194
(whether it be French, European, etc.) is still expressed in Cornelius de Pauw’s 195
Encyclopédie article “Amérique,” which concludes with a list of America’s useful 196
resources, from gold and silver to beaver skins and, further South, cinnamon, sandal- 197
wood, and “dragon’s blood” : : : and his very influential Recherches philosophiques 198
sur les Amériquains.13 We find the same intent in Linnaeus’ plans to import 199
foreign species of plants to Sweden, and it is presumably in the background of the 200
opening of the Abbé Guillaume-Thomas Raynal’s Histoire des deux-Indes (1770: 201
full title, Histoire philosophique et politique des établissements et du commerce des 202
Européens dans les deux Indes, a multi-authored work, large parts of which are 203
actually by Diderot), referring in particular to the impact of Iberian expansion: “No 204
event has been so interesting to mankind in general, and to the inhabitants of Europe 205
in particular, as the discovery of the new world, and the passage to India by the Cape 206
of Good Hope” (quoted in Gascoigne 2010). 207
Whether the creation of an island of warrior slaves or, more pedestrian, the 208
control over the growth and production of useful plants, what these forms of 209
globalization have in common is a kind of ‘total mobilization’ in which the globe 210
becomes unified: when Switzerland can be sought in the Indies, and the Indies in 211
Switzerland (paraphrasing the Zürich naturalist Johann Jakob Scheuchzer writing 212
in 1716; the original was more of a recommendation: “Switzerland must often be 213
sought in the Indies, and the Indies in Switzerland”).14 Or more bluntly yet, when 214
“Trade is raised to highest pitch, : : : the empire of Europe is now extended to the 215
utmost bounds of the Earth,” as stated in the unsigned Introduction to Awnsham and 216
John Churchill’s (1704) collection of Voyages and Travels, which may be by John 217
13De Pauw 1768–1770, reprinted 1990. I cannot take up here the debates on universalism and
relativism: suffice it to say that de Pauw combines both, if one compares his book to John Millar’s
later (1779) The origin of the distinction of ranks (a product of the Scottish Enlightenment), we
can see in Millar but not in de Pauw a clear, systematic intent to synthesize ethnographic data from
travelers, Jesuits etc. in order to formulate some relativistic principles for a nascent social science.
14Quoted in Pugliano 2009, 323. Scheuchzer was the author of the pre-Linnean Natur-Historie des
Schweizerlandes (1706–1718).
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Locke or by Edmond Halley.15 The scholarly version of Scheuchzer and Churchill’s 218
bold statements is the observation that, even if natural philosophy had always made 219
universal claims, “by the eighteenth century, the practical basis for these claims 220
was increasingly global, fostering new confidence in the universal validity of such 221
knowledge.”16 222
8.3 Radical Savants and Deterritorialized Knowledge 223
In contrast to the above forms of more or less globalized knowledge, the type of 224
knowledge produced by the radical savant is – not exactly globalized, in fact. Not 225
only is it not concerned with the extension of national glory, or with such forms 226
of ‘global reach’ in early modern natural philosophy, now shown to have had a 227
global economic context, or as a network in which scientist-travelers act as ‘go- 228
betweens’17 – and I am not addressing the sub-question of whether these journeys of 229
expansion and appropriation might have or bear their own ‘epistemology’, distinct 230
from that produced by politicians, intellectuals and other propagandists ‘back 231
home’: a more ‘transactional’ epistemology, coupled to a rather circular ‘ontology 232
of networks’. it is more of an attempt to make the familiar, unfamiliar. The radical 233
savant is something of an ‘internal exile’, although he often ends up away from his 234
native land, denied even the right to burial in his national church, as happened to La 235
Mettrie (Fontius 1967), Count Alberto Radicati di Passerano (Venturi 1954), or John 236
Toland (Jacob 1981). The lives and ideas of La Mettrie and Toland are well known 237
at this point, less so Radicati – a curious case of a radical exile expounding extreme 238
materialistic views which resonated throughout the century even if what he actually 239
wrote was not necessarily known directly. Like Toland and unlike La Mettrie, 240
he suffered in large part because of his ‘heterodoxy’ (in his case, his attraction 241
to Protestantism); he moved from Piedmont to England and after some years to 242
15
“An Introductory Discourse containing the whole History of Navigation,” in Churchill 1704,
vol. 1, lxxiii, cit. in Schaffer 2009, 247. The passage began, much like Linnaeus’s statements, by
referring to the benefits of the importation of new plants, drugs and spices: “Natural and moral
history is embellished with the most beneficial increase of so many thousands of plants it had
never before received, so many drugs and spices, such unaccountable diversity.”
16James Delbourgo and Nicholas Dew, “Introduction: The far side of the ocean,” in Delbourgo and
Dew 2008, 7.
17Hal Cook in his recent Matters of Exchange states that “it was no accident that the so-called
Scientific Revolution occurred at the same time as the development of the first global economy”
(Cook 2007, 411), but we never really learn why, or what this changes in other stories; clearly
medical and natural-historical knowledge are highly involved with commodities and exchange, but
this does not make them “the big science of the early modern period,” as Cook rather strangely
claims without explanation (410). For further analysis of early modern voyages of discovery as
integrating the worlds of commerce, science and ‘knowledge’ see the work of Kapil Raj, e.g. Raj
(2000); on go-betweens: Schaffer, Roberts et al., eds. (2009).
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Holland, where he died in 1737. While in England he published his most shocking 243
work, A Philosophical Dissertation on Death. Composed for the Consolation of the 244
Unhappy ‘by a friend to Truth’, a defense of suicide which had him thrown in prison 245
along with his translator and his publisher (Venturi 1954, 209–215). Radicati’s jus- 246
tification of suicide was based on a materialistic philosophy influenced by Toland. 247
This species of radicals – in the above case, materialists, although this is not 248
a necessary condition (neither Montaigne, nor François de La Mothe Le Vayer, 249
nor Henry de Boulainvillier are specifically committed to materialism) – are 250
not travelers; they rarely make it further than St Petersburg or Berlin; however, 251
as I indicate below, travel that remains virtual can also be a great source of 252
deterritorialization. As Deleuze put it in an interview in 1988, “Il ne faut pas trop 253
bouger pour ne pas effrayer les devenirs” (“One shouldn’t move around too much, it 254
scares off the [lines] of becoming,” Deleuze 1995, 138) – a phrase which, curiously 255
enough, applies quite well to Newton’s ‘immobility’, which his contemporaries 256
viewed in a favorable light as somehow complementary to the mobility of the 257
travelers who, for instance, went to the ends of the globe to measure the length 258
of a pendulum, such as the astronomer Jean Richer’s celebrated 10 month’s work in 259
Cayenne in 1672, or the priest Louis Feuillée’s similar experiments at Panama and 260
later Martinique, in 1712, reported to Newton by Cotes, and used in his calculations 261
(Schaffer 2009, 261–264). 262
Making the familiar – the territorial, the national – unfamiliar can be described, 263
as I mentioned above, as a process of deterritorialization, which, once again, is 264
not a process of becoming ‘at home in the world’, a Weltbürger, but rather one 265
of ceasing to belong anywhere, even if some bravely claim that they are “indifferent 266
towards climates and men,” like Théophile de Viau, who was burned in effigy in 267
front of Notre Dame in 1623. This kind of cognitive and intellectual process, which 268
is bound up with the formation of radical knowledge, goes back to another famous 269
story: that of Montaigne personally making the trip to see the cannibals. Montaigne 270
was not able to go all the way to the Amazon, but in 1562 he made the effort 271
to go to Rouen (522 km away, after all) to see a cannibal who had been brought 272
to France by the explorer Nicolas Durand de Villegagnon (Montaigne 1588/1992, 273
I.xxxi, “Des Cannibales,” 213). Montaigne made the journey because he believed in 274
the necessary role of experience in forming theories, rather than just relying on the 275
accounts of others. There is a strong sense here of ‘I saw’, ‘I experienced’, ‘I was 276
there’; like the traveler. Here, the difference between someone who has physically 277
crossed an ocean and been imprisoned by cannibals, like Hans von Staden (who was 278
almost eaten by the Tupinamba, but partly owed his escape to their desire to wait for 279
a certain species of berry to be ripe, which they liked to eat with human flesh: von 280
Staden 1557/2008) and Montaigne, plays almost no role. 281
Montaigne derived from this experience what is probably the fundamentum 282
inconcussum or Archimedean point of Western cultural relativism. Some cannibal 283
habits only seem barbarian to those who 284
call barbarism whatever is not [their] own practice : : : These nations, then, seem to me 285
barbarous in this sense, that they have been fashioned very little by the human mind, and 286
are still very close to their original naiveté. The laws of nature still rule them, very little 287
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corrupted by ours; and they are in such a state of purity that I am sometimes displeased 288
that they were unknown earlier, in the days when there were men able to judge them better 289
than us.18 290
Montaigne comments that “we may well call them barbarians, with respect to the 291
rules of reason, but not with respect to ourselves, as we surpass them in every kind 292
of barbarity” (210). 293
There is plenty of this usage of ‘proximal exotica’ in later radical thought: La 294
Mettrie slightly modifies the trope of the wild child with this reference to the ‘known 295
fact’ that in Poland, there are cases of kindly mother bears kidnapping newborn 296
babies and then raising them with as much affection as their own young.19 More 297
broadly, and more durably, travel accounts of animal species, typically ones like the 298
purported orang-outang, which disturb species boundaries (Tyson, Monboddo, La 299
Mettrie) can be used, along with some standard quotations from Bayle, Montaigne 300
and going back further, Lucretius, to support a theory of ‘animal minds’ which 301
becomes a centerpiece of clandestine and/or semi-public materialist philosophy.20 302
As I indicated above, materialism is not in itself either a necessary component of the 303
figure of the radical savant, or a necessary consequence: thinkers such as Montaigne, 304
Gassendi or Locke can build a case either for the legitimacy of the mores of other 305
peoples and/or for the ungrounded character of our own moral systems and cognitive 306
apparatus, without deriving from such narratives specific consequences about the 307
unity of the natural world, or the rejection of any boundary separating humans from 308
animals (as La Mettrie and Diderot certainly do). 309
To return to the figure of cannibals, this discussion had more than one use in 310
radical thought. One can roughly reduce these to three: (i) Montaigne is engaged in 311
a project of displacement of the familiar; (ii) Locke, when he takes up the cannibals 312
example in the Essay, uses it to support anti-innatist views with respect to what he 313
calls “practical principles” (that is, moral principles of conduct): he points out that 314
the Tupinamba tribe in the Amazon considers that a high form of virtue is eating 315
one’s enemies. 316
Instances of enormities practised without remorse. But I cannot see how any men should 317
ever transgress those moral rules, with confidence and serenity, were they innate, and 318
stamped upon their minds. : : : Have there not been whole nations, and those of the most 319
civilized people, amongst whom the exposing their children, and leaving them in the fields 320
18
“Chacun appelle barbarie ce qui n’est pas de son usage. : : : Ces nations me semblent donc ainsi
barbares, pour avoir receu fort peu de façon de l’esprit humain, et estre encore fort voisines de
leur naifveté originelle. Les loix naturelles leur commandent encores, fort peu abastardies par les
nostres; mais c’est en telle pureté, qu’il me prend quelque fois desplaisir dequoy la cognoissance
n’en soit venuë plustost, du temps qu’il y avoit des hommes qui en eussent sceu mieux juger que
nous” (Montaigne 1588/1992, I.xxxi, 205–206).
19
“On sait maintenant qu’il y a en Pologne des ourses charitables qui enlèvent des nouveaux-nés
laissés sur le seuil d’une porte par une nourrice imprudente, et les élèvent avec autant d’affection
et de bonté que leurs propres petits” (La Mettrie, Système d’Epicure, § xxxv).
20A good example of this is chapter 3 of the anonymous manuscript L’Âme Matérielle (approx.
1725–1730); see the edition by Alain Niderst (Niderst 2003).
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to perish by want or wild beasts has been the practice; as little condemned or scrupled as 321
the begetting them? Do they not still, in some countries, put them into the same graves with 322
their mothers, if they die in childbirth; or despatch them, if a pretended astrologer declares 323
them to have unhappy stars? And are there not places where, at a certain age, they kill or 324
expose their parents, without any remorse at all? In a part of Asia, the sick, when their 325
case comes to be thought desperate, are carried out and laid on the earth before they are 326
dead; and left there, exposed to wind and weather, to perish without assistance or pity. It is 327
familiar among the Mingrelians, a people professing Christianity, to bury their children alive 328
without scruple. There are places where they eat their own children. The Caribbees were 329
wont to geld their children, on purpose to fat and eat them. And Garcilasso de la Vega tells 330
us of a people in Peru which were wont to fat and eat the children they got on their female 331
captives, whom they kept as concubines for that purpose, and when they were past breeding, 332
the mothers themselves were killed too and eaten. The virtues whereby the Toupinambos 333
believed they merited paradise, were revenge, and eating abundance of their enemies. They 334
have not so much as a name for God, and have no religion, no worship. The saints who are 335
canonized amongst the Turks, lead lives which one cannot with modesty relate : : : 21 336
It should also be noted that, comparably to Montaigne’s encounter with the 337
cannibals, Locke met with Native Americans who had travelled to England from 338
North Carolina (Farr 2008, 498), and he discusses their mathematical abilities in 339
the Essay (II.xvi.6, at Locke 1975, 207); he goes into more detail about Native 340
Americans overall in the Second Treatise of Government. Locke also owned one of 341
the largest collections of travel writing in Britain. 342
Lastly (iii), examples like that of the cannibals, along with other descriptions of 343
the plurality of customs and beliefs observed by travelers, are used in the constitu- 344
tion of the earliest explicitly atheistic arguments, since they are employed to rebut or 345
weaken arguments for the existence of God. Of course, the testimony of travelers is 346
also used to support the idea of a “universal consent” to the existence of God (going 347
back to the locus classicus in Cicero, who suggested in the Disputationes tusculanes, 348
I.xiii, that all peoples, even if they have false ideas, possess an idea of the gods – 349
a kind of unanimity which should be considered a law of nature; Kors 1990, 138); 350
and Pierre Bayle in turn will criticize this ‘unanimity’ argument for legitimizing, 351
e.g. polytheism.22 Conversely, well-known texts such as the Jesuit Bartoloméo de 352
Las Casas’ 1527 Historia de las Indias will argue that there is no people, however 353
“barbarous,” who can be denied membership in the “Christian family.”23 Similarly, 354
Joseph-François Lafitau’s 1724 Mœurs des sauvages ameriquains, comparees aux 355
moeurs des premiers temps is an ethnographic document which insists on the innate 356
21Locke 1975, I.iii.9, at Locke 1975, 70–71; for further discussion of Locke’s anti-innatism in the
context of travel narratives, see Carey 2006, ch. 3 (who notes, among other things, the influence of
Gassendi’s Exercitationes paradoxicae adversus aristoteleos, written 1624–1626, published in his
Opera Omnia in 1658). A similar focus on the Tupinambas is found in La Forge 1666, 354; on the
Tupinamba as somehow paradigmatic cannibals, see Lestringant 1997.
22
“On ne prescrit pas contre la vérité par la tradition générale et par le consentement unanime de
tous les peuples” (Pensées diverses sur la comète, § xlv, in Bayle 1727–1731, III, 53).
23Pagden 1993, 69. That Las Casas, who was consistently an advocate of indigenous rights, was at
one stage Bishop of Chiapas may seem to us an odd irony of history (thinking down to the present
day’s EZLN and Subcomandante Marcos).
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religiosity of an indigenous population (here, Native Americans in Canada), in 357
order to “deflat[e] the atheistic potential in cross-cultural comparison by arguing 358
that all peoples had religions consistent with Christianity or had perverted them” 359
(Garrett 2005, 186). But in the type of narrative I am retracing here, narratives of 360
cannibals and other instances of early cultural relativism are directly used, alongside 361
or similarly to reports on Chinese religion or philosophy, as argumentative ‘planks’ 362
for Occidental atheism. However, before pursuing this atheistic development, I want 363
to insist a bit more on the dimension of ‘unfamiliarity’ and ‘displacement’. 364
8.4 Novelty, Unfamiliarity and Estrangement 365
Crucially, this new, unfamiliar knowledge also has a disturbing dimension: it pro- 366
duces a sense of estrangement or alienation ((what used to be called Entfremdung); 367
or, to use another over-determined word from another generation, part of what is 368
emerging here is The Other. Quite different from the endlessly recycled tale we 369
probably owe to Husserl’s Crisis (which is then reborn for each generation like a 370
phoenix, e.g. as ‘the Death of Nature’), that the flowering of natural science we as- 371
sociate with the Scientific Revolution ‘cuts us off from the world’, producing alien- 372
ation, creating a permanent divide between the world of quantity and laws of nature, 373
and the world of quality and values, my claim is that humanism, the New Science, 374
the challenge to Aristotelianism, and so forth, usher in a new disquiet, a sense that 375
essentialism (including species fixism, however much Aristotle may or may not have 376
believed in it: Wilkins 2009, 15–21) is false. To put it differently, the narrative of 377
decline that is sometimes reiterated about the Scientific Revolution, ‘modernity’ and 378
the like tells us that the new knowledge produced in early modern natural philosophy 379
divorces us from the world of meaning and value, in favor of a ‘positivistic’ world of 380
facts, quantities and laws of nature. In contrast, the story told here stresses that this 381
new knowledge, produced inseparably by experimentation, voyages, natural history, 382
philology, Orientalism, etc., does not usher in a confident era of science so much as 383
a new sense of the world as unfamiliar. Consider again Montaigne: 384
Until this time, all these miracles and strange events were hidden to me – I have never seen 385
monster nor miracle in the world more explicit than myself: One becomes familiar with 386
anything strange over time. But the more I brood and know myself, the more my deformity 387
astonishes me. The less I understand myself.24 388
As Tristan Dagron comments in an essay on Cardano, Montaigne and Vanini, 389
here “Nature has ceased to be a ‘world’. The rule which governs the arrangement 390
and the relationship of things is no longer that which guarantees the harmony and 391
24Essais, III, xi, “Des boiteux,”: “Jusques à cette heure tous ces miracles, et événements étranges,
se cachent devant moi – Je n’ai vu monstre et miracle au monde plus exprès que moi-même: On
s’apprivoise à toute étrangeté par l’usage et le temps, Mais plus je me hante et me connais, plus
ma difformité m’étonne. Moins je m’entends en moi” (Montaigne 1588/1992, 1029).
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unity of a totality, but rather the ‘rule’ of dispersion, variety and vicissitudinous 392
becoming which transforms everything into everything” (Dagron 2005, 55). In a 393
broader sense which I shall not discuss here, this is the sense that modernity is in its 394
essence defined by crisis – political, metaphysical and so on.25 395
We might take as the most vivid illustration of this inner disturbance in the West- 396
ern ethos, the monster (Curran et al. 1997; Wolfe 2005). Without wanting to play 397
up an ‘irrationalist’ history of science, there is a sense in which the fascination with 398
monsters from the late Renaissance well into the early Enlightenment is not a steady 399
process of naturalization and demystification of ‘folk biology’ towards a measur- 400
able, quantifiable scientific account of anomalies in biological development, but 401
rather a kind of crisis of anthropocentrism in which a burgeoning skepticism tries to 402
find support in the new empirical ‘sciences’ but instead just contributes to a growing 403
sense of strangeness (not to say Unheimlichkeit!). Exploration narratives during the 404
earlier part of this period are filled with this hope to discover monstrous races: “Who 405
has not seen monsters, has not traveled.”26 But in some cases it is good enough to 406
have intimate familiarity with accounts of monsters, or, as we saw with Montaigne 407
(who devotes another chapter of his Essais [II, xxx], to the case of a monstrous 408
child), to have some partially direct contact with the exotic. As regards familiarity 409
and strangeness, travel and internal exoticism (or deterritorialization and reterritori- 410
alization), an entire study could be written on the way some of the classic travel cum 411
natural history narratives, such as Pierre Boaistuau’s 1560 Histoires prodigieuses, 412
can move imperceptibly from tales of giant serpents or the unknown properties 413
of certain precious stones, to the “wondrous (prodigieuses) stories of the Jews” 414
(Boaistuau 1560, ch. X); Boaistuau probably doesn’t mean this as a compliment. 415
But the moral I derive from the emergence of this form of knowledge is not 416
the wonderful irreducibility of the strange and the preternatural, à la Lorraine 417
Daston (2000). Nor, granted, is it the extension of the world of the known. Rather, 418
“the more I brood and know myself, the more my deformity astonishes me. The 419
less I understand myself ”: there is a recognition of the destabilizing force of the 420
world of the unknown. This may usefully be compared to Jean Céard’s distinction 421
between two different strategies employed by early modern naturalists faced with 422
25Koselleck 1959/1988; Negri and Hardt 2000. There would be more to say here about ‘global
reach’ and stages or forms of globalization (not so much in debates over economic cycles,
concerning work such as Wallerstein’s and Arrighi’s – Wallerstein 1980; Arrighi 1995, 2007 –
but rather, concerning early forms of globalization, via Christianity and the like). While I am
obviously borrowing some aspects of Israel’s notion of ‘radical Enlightenment’, I am not using
either his distinction between a moderate and a radical Enlightenment, or his focus on Spinoza
and Spinozism as a driving force in the movement. Indeed, not all of the radical savants discussed
here are political radicals in any straightforward sense. From the libertins érudits to La Mettrie,
one can conceptually plan the destruction of an existing order – a metaphysical order, a religious
order – without having any interest in the democratization of knowledge and thus in political
revolutions; as I mention below, a ‘closet radical’ like La Mothe Le Vayer can explicitly oppose
his own cosmopolitanism and free-thinking attitude towards customs and norms, to the entrenched
prejudice of the common folk – without seeking to emend the latter.
26Kappler 1980, 115: “[Q]ui n’a pas vu de monstres, n’a pas voyagé.”
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unknown species and races, in which what I am discussing is closest to the 423
Franciscan priest and explorer André Thevet’s warning, in his 1558 Singularitez 424
de la France antartique, autrement nommée Amérique, that we should not inscribe 425
new discoveries under the heading of what we know: 426
Here are admirable facts of nature, and as she likes to do things grandly, diversely, and for 427
the most part, incomprehensible, and admirable to men. It would therefore be impertinent 428
to seek their cause and reason, like many try to do on a daily basis: because this is a real 429
secret of nature, whose knowledge is reserved for the creator alone.27 430
This does not sound like much of a program for building knowledge, however 431
radical. And there is a sense in which the inheritors of this line of thought – people 432
like La Mettrie, Buffon and Diderot (and possibly Joseph Priestley and Erasmus 433
Darwin on the other side of the Channel, in the next generation) – are committed 434
to building cognitive edifices, even if these do not always resemble strictly natural- 435
philosophical endeavours (“Do you see this egg? With this you can overthrow all 436
the schools of theology, all the churches of the world.”28) But this is after all a 437
problem inherent in the concept of deterritorialization itself: how are you meant to 438
build something on it? 439
8.5 “Mummy, are Hunchbacks French?”29 440
I’ve said earlier that a narrative such as that of the cannibals – or that of monsters, or 441
that of navigation to ‘America’ – has several possible radical, destabilizing uses, and 442
precisely these need not be collapsed into some purely internalized Pascalian fright 443
and contemplation. It is a destabilization in and of knowledge, which however can 444
also be productive of knowledge (but then the question is, which knowledge or at 445
least what sort of knowledge? And it is not clear that the work of the radical savant 446
flows in any linear fashion into the emergence of a positive science; an exile – a 447
thinker and agent of deterritorialization – is unlikely to be the Secretary of any 448
learned society30). The classic example of this is what is often stressed about the 449
27Thevet, Singularitez : : : , f. 99a, quoted in Céard 1977/1996, 312. Thevet’s work is known in good
part also for its description of Brazilian cannibals. In his later Cosmographie universelle Thevet
devotes a chapter to “Why I call this land ‘Antarctic France’ which others falsely call the Indies”
(Thevet 1575, Bk. XXI, ch. 3; vol. II, 911a). “Car étant cette terre découverte de notre temps,
si grande comme elle est ce serait simplesse que de la soumettre au nom particulier de l’Inde”;
“Car l’Inde est orientale et l’Antarctique est toute méridionale: le Pérou, Mexique, la Floride entre
l’Équateur et le Pôle Arctique. Par quoi vous pouvez voir la faute de plusieurs hommes de notre
siècle.” Quoted and discussed in Hoquet 2005.
28Diderot, Rêve de D’Alembert (approx. 1769), in Diderot 1994, 618. I discuss Diderot’s
‘biological Spinozism’ and the emergence of ‘biology’ as a science in Wolfe 2011.
29Hugo, Choses vues, August 3d 1846, in Hugo 1987, 600; Wolfe 2008.
30As regards the relation of the radical savant to institutions, it was easy enough, in the set of
distinctions with which I began, to oppose the ‘company man’ à la Boyle to the solitary Descartes
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discovery and conquest of America: that by doing so, Europe is “not just discovering 450
an unknown geographical space,” but also, an unnerving sense of its own past, “that 451
the accumulated wisdom of the Ancients might be, if not entirely false, at least 452
seriously flawed” (Pagden 1993, 89): an oft-cited and early instance of this is the 453
Jesuit José de Acosta’s comment on his journey to the ‘Indies’ (Acosta had a leading 454
role in the Jesuit mission, and was later the rector of the University of Salamanca 455
and advisor to King Phillip II): 456
I will describe what happened to me when I passed to the Indies. Having read what poets 457
and philosophers write of the Torrid Zone, I persuaded myself that when I came to the 458
Equator, I would not be able to endure the violent heat, but it turned out otherwise : : : For 459
when I passed (the Equator) : : : I felt so cold : : : What could I do but laugh at Aristotle’s 460
Meteorology and his philosophy? For in that place and season, where everything by his rules 461
should have been scorched by the heat, I and my companions were cold.31 462
More is at stake here than a wrong map, or even the anxiety experienced when 463
one realizes that the parent or authority figure can be wrong, or conversely the 464
gleefulness with which some of the free-thinkers could catalogue instances in which 465
reports from travelers refute Biblical stories and geographies, or more recent tales 466
of wonders and marvels (La Mothe Le Vayer’s Remarques géographiques is filled 467
with such reports, including also naturalistic confirmations of wondrous tales: faced 468
with denials of a tale of oysters growing on trees on a certain island, he reports 469
that in Madagascar, orange and lemon trees grow on the beaches, and that after 470
a particularly high tide there can be oysters left hanging on the tree branches, 471
Moreau 2010, 56). There is a sense, both of a profound disturbance in the ‘fabric’ 472
of knowledge, and concomitantly of a disturbance in one’s self -knowledge. 473
This sense that the authoritative texts need to be abandoned in turn engenders a 474
weakening of the dominant European narrative which is not merely non-colonial or 475
non-exploitative (Las Casas) or culturally relativistic (Montaigne, Locke, Diderot). 476
For it is perfectly possible to ‘meet the Other and understand him’ as part of this 477
and the radical Boyer d’Argens or La Mettrie. But this leaves out the role, primarily in the next
century, of institutions such as dissenting academies, which precisely trace their roots to individuals
who could not get into Oxford and Cambridge in the late seventeenth century (thanks to John
Gascoigne for this point). One could also point to Protestant, sometimes Huguenot-based scientific
clubs in the early Enlightenment in places such as The Hague (discussed in Jacob 2006) – but
they were secret. A point closer to my own narrative is that the radical usage of, e.g., philology
is definitely not a solitary enterprise; texts such as the Treatise of the Three Impostors emerged in
milieus such as the Berlin salons of the early 1700s. By the next century, a heterodox institution
such as the Lunar Society of Birmingham appears, at which James Watt, Joseph Priestley, Matthew
Boulton and Erasmus Darwin meet, with a shared ‘materialist’ goal focusing on the practical,
public consequences of the knowledge produced therein.
31José de Acosta, De Natura novi orbis libri duo (Salamanca 1589), later entitled Historia natural
y moral de las Indias, translated into French by Robert Regnault or Regnauld as Histoire naturelle
et morale des Indes tant orientales qu’occidentales (Paris: Orry, 1598), II, ch. IX, in Acosta 1617,
63b. John Gascoigne describes Acosta’s History as “a pioneering work of anthropology and natural
history” (Gascoigne 2010). For discussion see Duchet 1971/1995 and Abbattista and Minuti, eds.,
2006.
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dominant narrative; indeed, Tzvetan Todorov has suggested that the extraordinary 478
success with which the European has colonized and assimilated the Other is “chiefly 479
due to their capacity to understand the other” (Todorov 1984, 248). Montaigne’s 480
brooding – but also the fascination with monsters – is something else again: not the 481
transparency of ‘know the other, know thyself’ but the opacity and ‘exoticism’ of 482
“the more I brood” : : : 483
One could ask if and how the problem of grasping the existence of the monster 484
translates into voyages of discovery which problematize national identity (whether 485
via the savage purity of the Americas or the higher refinement of China); it is 486
tempting to answer with an example from natural languages, here, Russian, in 487
which the word for monster is urod, namely, that which stands apart from the 488
rodina, the motherland (Lecouteux 1999, 11), the place of birth. Or from everyday 489
life, as reported by Victor Hugo: “I saw a hunchback pass in the street. A little 490
girl nearby stared at him in surprise and said to her mother: ‘Mummy, look at that 491
man!’ ‘Well, my child, do not look at him, he doesn’t like that. He is a hunchback’. 492
‘Mummy, are hunchbacks French?’”32 Whether in faraway accounts or at home, 493
the monster is not merely a natural category but one which expresses a-nationality 494
or a-territoriality. It is no longer very bold or original, after all, to note that our 495
conceptions of Nature – as order, as norm, as source of value – are never neutral, 496
which is to say that they are always valuative. 497
8.6 Confucius as Spinoza: Travel and Atheism 498
Travel narratives, whether they showcase the unadorned peaux-rouges of the New 499
World or the highly educated Chinese scholar, perturb both a sense of familiarity 500
about oneself and one’s ‘world’, and some of its foundational tenets; pushed to 501
the extreme, they yield an argument for atheism, indeed, a variety of different 502
arguments for atheism. Here is Locke again – someone who was certainly not an 503
atheist himself – juxtaposing Caribbean tribes and “the literati of China” as evidence 504
for stable, and morally stable practices of atheism: 505
Idea of God not innate. If any idea can be imagined innate, the idea of God may, of all 506
others, for many reasons, be thought so; since it is hard to conceive how there should be 507
innate moral principles, without an innate idea of a Deity. Without a notion of a law-maker, 508
it is impossible to have a notion of a law, and an obligation to observe it. Besides the atheists 509
taken notice of amongst the ancients, and left branded upon the records of history, hath 510
not navigation discovered, in these later ages, whole nations, at the bay of Soldania, in 511
Brazil [here Locke mentions de Léry, CW], [in Boranday,] and in the Caribbee islands, &c., 512
amongst whom there was to be found no notion of a God, no religion? : : : These are 513
instances of nations where uncultivated nature has been left to itself, without the help of 514
letters and discipline, and the improvements of arts and sciences. But there are others to 515
be found who have enjoyed these in a very great measure, who yet, for want of a due 516
application of their thoughts this way, want the idea and knowledge of God. It will, I doubt 517
not, be a surprise to others, as it was to me, to find the Siamites of this number. But for this, 518
32Hugo, Choses vues, August 3d 1846, in Hugo 1987, 600; Wolfe 2008.
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let them consult the King of France’s late envoy thither, who gives no better account of the 519
Chinese themselves. And if we will not believe La Loubere, the missionaries of China, even 520
the Jesuits themselves, the great encomiasts of the Chinese, do all to a man agree, and will 521
convince us, that the sect of the literari, or learned, keeping to the old religion of China, and 522
the ruling party there, are all of them atheists. Vid. Navarette, in the Collection of Voyages, 523
vol. i., and Historia Cultus Sinensium. And perhaps, if we should with attention mind the 524
lives and discourses of people not so far off, we should have too much reason to fear, that 525
many, in more civilized countries, have no very strong and clear impressions of a Deity 526
upon their minds, and that the complaints of atheism made from the pulpit are not without 527
reason. : : : (Essay, I.iv.8, Locke 1975, 87–88). 528
China actually plays the largest role here: “the sect of the literari, or learned, keeping 529
to the old religion of China, and the ruling party there, are all of them atheists.” 530
And throughout the next two generations, radical (and frequently clandestine, 531
anonymous) texts multiply references to China, most often in support of a program 532
of (European) radicalism. The anonymous author of the manuscript Les Doutes 533
des Pirroniens (Doubts of the Pyrrhonians, dated circa 1696–1711) illustrates the 534
possibility of a republic of atheists precisely by referring to Chinese society: 535
The dominant Religion of the great empire of China, particularly that of its magistrates, 536
is pure Atheism; as they believe in the eternity of the world, know no other God but the 537
Spirit or the Active Virtue of the Sky, and do not believe in the immortality of the soul, or 538
in rewards and punishments after death.33 539
Now, further on in the text the author revises his claim somewhat and calls this 540
“dominant Religion” “a kind of Atheism or Deism” (fol. 89), and then concedes 541
that it may be improper to call them Atheists per se, since (“like the Egyptians”) 542
they hold that the eternal matter of the universe is animated by a kind of divine 543
soul (fol. 90). This sort of clandestine usage of China, while it is not an extreme 544
(or ‘strong’) case of deterritorialization, is nevertheless saying more than just ‘in 545
China they do things better than us’. It is building on Pierre Bayle’s idea that China 546
amounted to “a society of atheists – millions of them – who seemed to be living 547
civilized and honorable lives. This seemed to cast doubt on the need for any religious 548
basis for morality if so large a society as China could operate without religion” 549
(Popkin 2003, 271). In another anonymous manuscript, this one from approximately 550
1770, entitled Dialogues sur l’âme (Dialogues on the Soul), the narrator describes 551
how difficult it is to find the home in Paris of a philosopher he has heard discuss the 552
materiality of the soul. Then he comments: “In China people would have known. 553
It is not that their cities are any smaller or less populated; but there, it is by merit 554
that people are placed in the first rank.”34 Similarly, one of the many versions of the 555
33
“La Religion dominante du vaste Empire de la Chine, qui est particulierement celle des
Magistrats, est le pur Atheïsme ; puisqu’ils croyent l’éternité du monde, qu’ils ne connoissent point
d’autre Dieu, que l’Esprit, ou la Vertu Active du Ciel, et enfin qu’ils ne croyent pas à l’immortalité
de l’ame, non plus qu’aux peines et recompenses après la mort” (Anon., Doutes des Pirroniens,
Bibliothèque Royale de Belgique, ms. 15191, f. 40, cit. in Benítez 2007).
34Anon., Dialogues sur l’âme, ms. Bibliothèque Mazarine 1191, I, fol. 109–110, cit. in Benítez
1996b, 403.
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Treatise of the Three Impostors, by the ‘atheist priest’ Etienne Guillaume, opposes 556
Moses and Jesus to Socrates, Plato and Confucius in order to argue that the latter 557
three are more ethically and intellectually admirable than the former two (Israel 558
2006, 714). 559
Henry de Boulainvillier’s materialist-Spinozist usage of China is more explicitly 560
that of a radical savant. Boulainvillier (as he preferred to spell his name) was the 561
author of several chemical treatises of the Helmontian variety, a primer of Port- 562
Royal logic, and rather more influential works of historical scholarship on the 563
origins of monarchy (and a less-known history of Mohammed). But in addition, he 564
translated Spinoza’s Ethics and wrote some of the most penetrating commentaries 565
on the latter’s work. Curiously for our purposes, Boulainvillier explains that after 566
reading several refutations of Spinoza, what finally convinced him to return to the 567
texts of the Dutch thinker was the publication of the “doctrine of the Chinese” in the 568
volumes of the Jesuit missions.35 In his 1731 Essai de métaphysique, Boulainvillier 569
plays a complex rhetorical game: he simultaneously (a) praises Confucius over and 570
above any Western thinker, (b) uses the cultural prestige that the name and figure of 571
Confucius had at the time to legitimize (Eurocentric) radical thought, by describing 572
Confucius as an atheist and a materialist, and (c) tries to defend or rehabilitate the 573
dreaded name of Spinoza, by saying that according to the Jesuits, Confucius is given 574
the highest honours in his country; and his ideas are really not so different from 575
Spinoza; thus it should not be such a scandal to admire Spinoza. Boulainvillier is 576
building here on the Baylean image of a country populated by millions of ‘virtuous 577
atheists’. 578
It is important not to confuse this clandestine articulation of Spinoza and 579
Confucius with the negative portrayal of Spinoza, the metaphysician of One 580
Substance, as somehow ‘Oriental’ (and thus not really legitimately part of Western 581
philosophy; the trope of ‘Spinoza the Oriental’ was already used by Bayle, and 582
goes straight through to Hegel36). In the clandestine context, assimilating Spinoza 583
and Confucius could mean a praise of Chinese anteriority, a diminishment of the 584
purported originality of a radical European thinker, or a Lettres persanes-style 585
fictitious critique of Eurocentrism. (The cultural prestige of Confucius was such 586
that, as noted by Nicholas Dew, the influential 1687 collection of Confucius’ 587
writings, the Jesuit-prepared Confucius, Philosopher of the Chinese (Confucius 588
Sinarum Philosophus, sive Scientia Sinensis Latinè exposita), received a review 589
in the influential Journal des Sçavans, that was literally 7 times longer than that 590
of Newton’s Principia in the same year, i.e., 7 pages to 1 page.37) However, one 591
35Henri de Boulainvilliers (correct spelling Boulainvillier, which apparently he was very attached
to, as Renée Simon indicates in her introduction to volume 1 of his works), Essai de métaphysique
(1731), in Boulainvilliers 1973, I, 84. See also Bove 2008. On Boulainvillier’s relation to libertine
salon culture see Wade 1938, 97–123.
36On Spinoza, ‘the Oriental’ see Hulin 1983. On the more positive Spinoza-Confucius parallels
see Israel 2001, 588, 2006, ch. 25.
37For the review of the Principia: Journal des Sçavans (Amsterdam), August 2, 1688, 128; for
the review of Confucius Sinarum Philosophus, Jan. 5, 1688, 5–12. See discussion in Dew 2009,
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should not think that all clandestine discussions of China are univocally positive; 592
some also challenge its form of government, as in Nicolas-Antoine Boulanger’s 593
Recherches sur l’origine du despotisme oriental, published in 1761 by d’Holbach. 594
For Boulanger, the Chinese form of government is an obstacle to progress, to the 595
extent that 1 day, “the Chinese will be the unhappiest people of the earth” (§ 23).38 596
This becomes a classic trope in Helvétius, Mably and others. 597
8.7 Radical Erudition 598
But to return to the radical savant, his discussion of types of knowledge, beliefs 599
and doctrines from China and elsewhere is definitely a kind of erudition at work (in 600
the sense of the libertins érudits onwards, that is, the group of ‘gentlemen virtuosi’ 601
under protection of powerful patrons who pursued sceptical and Epicurean forms of 602
erudition in the seventeenth century, such as François de La Mothe Le Vayer (1588– 603
1672), tutor to the Duc d’Anjou (the brother of Louis XIV) and overall skeptical man 604
of letters, who Popkin dismisses rather cruelly as “an insipid Montaigne” (Popkin 605
2003, 83) and Gabriel Naudé (1600–1653), author of the famous Considérations 606
politiques sur les coups d’État, member of the Académie française, and secretary 607
to Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin and to Queen Christina of Sweden; Pintard 608
1943/1983). In direct contradistinction to the way much globalized knowledge 609
is reincorporated in national usage (the Bacon-Linnaeus model), the production 610
of knowledge as deterritorialization is, to a great extent, the usage of forms of 611
exotic knowledge (whether about the past, through philology, or distant territories, 612
through travel narratives) in the service of a challenging or a weakening of national 613
narratives. As previously noted, it does not matter whether the travel is actual 614
or virtual in this case; one also thinks of the role of utopias, notably Cyrano’s 615
1648 Etats et empires du soleil, to which one may possibly add Kepler’s 1634 616
Somnium (see Ofer Gal’s essay “Two Bohemian Journeys” here) and Fontenelle’s 617
1686 Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes, which explicitly says that when we 618
are faced with the possibility of walking on the moon, we are in the position of the 619
inhabitants of America before it was discovered by Columbus. 620
206–207, and more generally Mungello 1998, 90 f. The text was produced by at least seventeen
Jesuit missionaries, with the help of many Chinese interlocutors, across almost a century. It gave
Latin translations of three of the ‘Four Books’ (Sishu) that the Jesuits had identified as the core of
the Confucian canon: the Great Learning (the Daxue), the Doctrine of the Mean (Zhongyong), and
the Analects (Lunyu); the Mengzi or Mencius, was left out (Dew 2009, 210).
38In a note to this section Boulanger uses the term ‘despotism’: “L’empire de la Chine demontre
la sublime speculation des premiers hommes qui ont cru se rendre heureux en etablisssant un
gouvernement semblable a celui du ciel, il ne faut cependant pas croire que le gouvernement
chinois puisse justifier les theocraties terrestres par ce que les beaux traits de l’histoire de la chine
ne peuvent pas contrebalancer les maux que le despotisme y a causé et qu’il cause chez les autres
nations.”
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Just as the travel narratives could be used as evidence for the existence of ‘mil- 621
lions of virtuous atheists’, or as support for Spinozism, or more modestly to stress 622
the skeptical point that we might not have absolute knowledge of, e.g. morality, 623
given the variety of customs in different parts of the world (hence we should suspend 624
judgment, the skeptical epoche), similarly, our interpretive categories should not 625
boil down to a monolithic definition of the radical savant. The weaker form of the 626
destabilizing, deterritorializing force of a certain type of knowledge or discovery, 627
is captured by studies of the rise of early modern skepticism such as Richard 628
Popkin’s. Namely, tales of worlds beyond the familiar oceans, the size of their 629
animals, whether one is hot or cold at the crossing of the Equator, or whether the 630
theologies of the Indians or Chinese or Native Americans confirm, challenge or 631
are neutral with respect to the narrative of Scripture certainly call into question 632
the reliability of knowledge as such. But the stronger form of this radicalism goes 633
beyond the skeptical motif (Charron, Montaigne, La Mothe Le Vayer, possibly 634
Locke), according to which exotic knowledge “functioned for thinkers of the period 635
as an emblem of the problem of knowledge-making in general” (Dew 2009, 235). It 636
carries the disturbance further. Of course, the natural response here is to inquire into 637
the exact status of this deterritorialized – or better, deterritorializing – knowledge. 638
Clearly, this is not ‘colonial’, ‘imperial’, or ‘mercantile’ knowledge which would 639
let itself be subsumed into a project of national or royal glory, but it also does 640
not seem to fit the obvious opposite model – itself quite legitimately ‘radical’: 641
that of a ‘knowledge from below’ (whether this is taken in a more Marxist sense: 642
Rancière 1981; Moulier Boutang 1998, or a more post-Marxist sense, including 643
that of Foucault: Fehér 1982/1987). In that case, what type of knowledge is being 644
produced here? 645
In some cases, there is a ‘weakly deterritorialized’ form of knowledge which 646
we can view as somehow cosmopolitan or at least anti-provincial, as when the 647
vitalist physicians in Montpellier warn against underestimating the importance and 648
sophistication of Chinese sphygmology (medicine of the pulse), in comparison to 649
Western medicine, or earlier – and more metaphorically – La Mothe Le Vayer’s 650
insistence that the best years of his life were spent outside his country, travel having 651
freed his mind from the constraint of local customs: a freedom opposed to the inertia 652
of “the common people” (la multitude, cit. in Dew 2009, 147; see also Moreau 653
2010). In other cases, there is a kind of exoticism which sometimes becomes, 654
or is reappropriated as, what I have termed ‘radical exotica’ (Montaigne, Boyer 655
d’Argens) or an entirely non-exotic, but strongly relativist case for weakening our 656
confidence in the mores and norms of our societies (as in Locke). Here, current 657
post-colonial or ‘global knowledge’ theory would insist on the way in which even 658
parochial knowledge is actually always already hybridized.39 But, following Tristan 659
Dagron, I am more concerned with instances in which the new knowledge is 660
genuinely destabilizing (whether or not it is genuinely new – after all, a form 661
39For redefinitions of the scientific knowledge collected at the “periphery” and processed at the
“center” see Gruzinski 1999 and White 1991, and for the case of Newton see Schaffer 2009.
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of atheist argument can be found as early as Tertullian, who is rediscovered in 662
early modern radical theological texts by Henry Layton and others, including, more 663
critically, by Malebranche; Thomson 2008), so that travelers like José Acosta and 664
André Thevet can insist that we not inscribe new discoveries under the heading of 665
what we know. In addition, the radical savant is not engaged in an enterprise of 666
stable knowledge-gathering with relatively well defined goals, as would be the case 667
of the natural philosopher (allowing for exceptions). 668
8.8 Conclusion 669
I have tried to describe, rather summarily, the difference but also relations between 670
several kinds of modernizing discourses, all of which share 671
(i) a certain overdetermined relation to travel (whether travel narratives, transla- 672
tions of scientific or theological texts from e.g. China, or personal encounters 673
with ‘otherness’ like Montaigne going to meet the cannibal chieftains), and as 674
we have seen, the travel can be actual or virtual; 675
(ii) a ‘radical’ tendency to want to either start afresh, from the foundations upwards 676
(Bacon), or at least focus on the production of new knowledge, including with 677
reference to the worlds beyond the seas (Bacon again, Linnaeus). 678
(iii) Subtly different from the latter category would be a case like the vitalist 679
appropriation of (and praise for) Chinese medical knowledge. It is not so 680
nationalistic (I called it ‘cosmopolitan’) but shares with the Baconian kind of 681
program a cumulative attitude towards knowledge. 682
Moving towards the more specific definition of the radical savant as a thinker 683
in and of deterritorialization, we come to cultural relativism, which does not 684
have to directly entail either atheism or materialism, and which fuels two distinct 685
projects: cognitive analyses such as Locke’s anti-innatism, and more political 686
analyses such as Diderot’s Supplément au voyage de Bougainville (1772), including 687
the critique of sexual repression in Western society, and his contribution to Raynal’s 688
Histoire des Deux-Indes (1781); and sometimes these two projects – sensationist 689
or empiricist arguments about how the mind is ‘furnished’ with its ideas through 690
the senses and relativistic travel narratives – come together in one individual, 691
such as the great traveler and empiricist philosopher François Bernier (c.1625– 692
1688).40 Similarly, accounts presenting Confucianism as a kind of unproblematic, 693
40Bernier lived for years in Mughal India and wrote a massively successful multi-volume history
cum political and anthropological study of the peoples and customs of South Asia, the 1670
Histoire de la dernière Révolution des Etats du Grand Mogol (Bernier 1670, translated at the
time as The History of the Late Revolution of the Empire of the Great Mogol, Bernier 1671; see
the excellent analysis in Dew 2009, ch. 3), but was also a pupil of Gassendi who wrote the most
influential summary of the latter’s philosophy, the equally massive Abrégé de la philosophie de
Gassendi (Bernier 1678), which influenced Locke amongst others in the articulation of a hedonistic
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and morally worthy Spinozism of the East, which I shall discuss below, certainly 694
can be part of an atheistic narrative, without having to be so. However, Montaigne’s 695
brooding –and also the fascination with monsters – is something else again. The 696
more naturalistic and more destabilizing analysis of phenomena such as monsters, is 697
the recognition of the presence of a kind of knowledge which is not just the confident 698
intention to ‘revise our maps and fill in the blanks’. It is a deterritorialization in the 699
sense of a disturbance in the foundational certainties of a territory. 700
Recalling Deleuze-Guattari’s example of Kafka as the practitioner of a “minor 701
literature” which deterritorializes the ‘native’ lands and languages in which he found 702
himself, we might say the paramount case, not of the early modern radical savant 703
in particular, but of deterritorialization, is Creole languages.41 Or, to use another 704
vocabulary, the radical savant as discussed here is not a thinker of Empire but of 705
‘multitude’ (Negri and Hardt 2000), where Empire is the name for a system that 706
seeks to facilitate globalization as a ‘closed system’ of increased efficiency, and 707
‘multitude’ is the name for that part, or mirror image, or monstrous double of Empire 708
in which globalization becomes an ‘open system’: 709
The multitude must be able to decide if, when and where it moves. It must have the right also 710
to stay still and enjoy one place rather than being forced to be constantly on the move. The 711
general right to control its own movement is the multitude’s ultimate demand for global 712
citizenship. This demand is radical insofar as it challenges the fundamental apparatus of 713
imperial control over the production and life of the multitude. (Negri and Hardt 2000, 400, 714
authors’ emphasis). 715
Just as the radical savant is neither the fluid ‘go-between’, traveler, diplomat, 716
mercenary, nor the Weltbürger who feels equally at home in any environment, 717
the condition described here is not tantamount to cosmopolitanism or “extrater- 718
ritoriality” (Siegfried Kracauer’s word, itself borrowed from Georg Simmel, for 719
the condition of thought which necessarily requires an ‘outside’ or exteriority; Jay 720
1986; Jeanpierre 2005). It is also a radicalism which rejects ‘Empire’ (as is manifest 721
in the Diderot-Raynal Histoire des deux-Indes, for instance, with its lucid critical 722
remarks on colonialism and commerce). These travelers, actual and virtual, erudite 723
and self-taught, are not so interested in the self-contemplation of their own otherness 724
(although La Mettrie plays a lot with his exiled situation at Frederick’s court and this 725
doubtless fuels the dark humor with which he contributes to the myth of “Monsieur 726
Machine” or “Herrn Maschine”) as in the contemplation of otherness tout court 727
(first step, as with monstrosity, exotica, etc.) and then in the proclamation of a 728
deterritorialized knowledge (second step, as in the integration of figures such as 729
Confucius and Spinoza, in the Doutes des Pirroniens or Boulainvillier). Of course 730
motivational psychology, and an ‘empiricist’ account of cognition and the formation of ideas
(Milton 2000).
41A recent discussion of ‘Creoleness’ by major Francophone Caribbean authors has it this way:
“Neither Europeans, nor Africans, nor Asians, we proclaim ourselves Creoles. This will be for us
an interior attitude – better, a vigilance, or even better, a sort of mental envelope in the middle
of which our world will be built in full consciousness of the outer world” (Bernabé, Chamoiseau,
Confiant 1989/1993, 75).
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these general distinctions themselves contain further subdivisions: thus otherness 731
can go both ways – from Orientalizing Spinoza to using the Chinese discussion to 732
legitimate Western atheism. And even the latter kind of deterritorializing project 733
can remain relatively narrow (like the confrontation with otherness in Diderot’s 734
Supplément au voyage de Bougainville) or open-ended (as in Montaigne). 735
In discussing these different discourses, I have tried to emphasize the pertinence 736
for ‘global knowledge’ analyses of a type of thinker who does not travel, except 737
imaginatively, but, in this ‘internal exile’, plays an important role in perturbing 738
the familiarity of the ‘domestic’ narrative, whether by stating his “indifference 739
towards men and climates,” like Théophile de Viau, conjuring up strange gems, 740
monstrosities, cannibals, or hairy men, like Boaistuau, Cardano, Montaigne and 741
Locke, or conversely by removing the ‘strangeness’ from Spinozism or atheism, by 742
appeals to Confucianism or Islam. These deterritorialized conceptual performances, 743
sometimes accompanied by a whiff of exoticism, sometimes predominantly bearing 744
the mask of erudition, challenge key national and metaphysical commitments – from 745
our sense of normality/abnormality to the existence of God. This is a far cry from 746
either just exoticism or wonderful strangeness. 747
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